Abstract-In secure multicast canimunications. keg management schemes are eniployed to prevent unauthorized access to multicast content. Key management, however, can disclose the information ahout the dynamics of the grnup memhenhip, such as the group size and the numher of join and departure users, to both inside and outside attackers. This is a threat to applications with confidential group membership information. This paper investigetes attacklanti-attack strategies for stealing/protecting group dynamic information in the existing key management schemes. We show that attackers can successful$ acquire the membership information hy esploiting the key updating prucedum in popular centralized key managenlent .schemes. Particularly, we develop two attack strategies and demonstrate their effectiveness through siniulationr. Further, n e propose an antiattack technique utilizing hatch rekeying and plirntom wers. and derive performance criteria that descrihe the security level of the proposed scheme using mutual information. The proposed anti-attack scheme is evaluated hased on the data ohtained from real MBone sessions.
I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid progress in the technologies underlying multicast networking has led to the development of many multicast services. such as streaming stock quotes. video conferencing and communal gaming (11. Before these group-oriented multicast applications can be successfully deployed. access control mechanism must be developed such that only authorized users can access the group communication [21 [31. Access control is usually achieved by encrypting the content using an encryption key. known as the session key (SK) that is shared by all legitimate group members. Since the group membership will most likely be dynamic with users joining and leaving the service. it is necessary to update the encryption keys in order to prevent the leaving user irom accessing future communication and prevent the joining user irom accessin:! prior communication Both centralized and contributory key management schemes address the problem of maintaining access control with dynamic membership and reducing the usage of computation.
communication and storage resources [?I [3l 1161 . These schemes. however. did not consider the disclosure of iniormation about the dynamics of the group membership to both insiders and outsiders. We collectively refer to groiq~ rl!namics information (GDI) as information describing the dynamic membership oi a group application. such as the number of users in the multicast proup as a function of time, and the number of users who join or leave the service during a time interval.
In many group communications. group dynamic information is confidential and should not be disclosed to either valid group members or outsiders. For example. in a commercial multicast program. the service provider performs group management and has the knowledge of GDI. Although the service provider may release some audience statistics at his choosing time. it is highly undesirable to disclose instant detailed dynamic membership information to competitors, who would develop effective competition strategies by analyzing the statistical behavior 01-the audience. Another example is a military group communication scenaio-where GDI represents the number of soldiers in the battlefield and the number of soldiers moving into or out of certain areas. In this situation. the valid group members. i.e. regular soldiers. may only he entitled to obtain general information through the secure group communication.
but not entitled to acquire GDI. Leaking GDI to outsiders, most likely to the enemies. can be devastating.
The traditional key management schemes are designed to prevent unauthorized access to the multicast content. but unfortunately also provide opportunities for unauthorized parties to obtain group dynamic information. The dynamic group membership information can he revealed unknowingly while performing key management. With the proliferation of access control in many applications. such a new security concern amply arises. Therefore. it is important to investigate this new threat and improve the design of current key management schemes such that both the group dynamic information and the multicast content are protected. Contributory key management schemes are generally not suitable for the applications with confidential GDI because each group member need to he aware of other group members in order to establish the shared group key in the distributed manner. In this paper. we will focus on centralized schemes.
We demonstrate that the cenualized key management schemes can reveal the GDI easily and propose a framework of protecting GDI from inside and outside attackers. We have developed two effective strategies to attack and steal information about the membership dynamics from the tree-based cenualized schemes [21-[71 that employ tree hierarchy for the maintenance of keying material. These strategies involve exploiting the format of rekey messages and estimating GDI directly from the size of the rekey messages. We also developed an antiattack method that is fully compatible with the existing key management schemes. By utilizing batch rekeying 1221 and introducing phantom users. the proposed anti-attack method aims to minimize the mutual information between the rekeying process observed by the attackers and the true group dynamics.
Various aspects of the proposed anti-attack scheme. such as the communication overhead and the leakage of GDI. are evaluated based.on the data obtained from MBone sessions. The analysis on other non-tree based schemes is also provided.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The attack strategies and the anti-attack method for'the centralized schemes are presented in Section I1 and Section 111 respectively. In Section IV. the perfon$mce criteria of the proposed anti-attack method are derived and the optimization problem is formulated. Simulation results based on the user log data from real MBone sessions are shown in Section V. followed hy the conclusion in Section VI.
GDI ATTACKS O N CENTRALIZED KEY MANAGEMENT,

SCHEMES
In this section. we investigate the attack strategies that aim to attack the CCntIdliZed key management schemes for obtaining the dynamic group information. In this work, the group dynamic information (GDI) particularly refers to a set of functions as: The GDI should he kept confidential in many group-oriented applications. yet to acquire GDI by launching attacks on the key management schemes can be very simple as we will demonstrate. instead of trying to break the encryption or compromise the key distribution center: the adversaries can subscribe to the service as regular users. In this case. they are -referred to as the inside attackers. As we will show later in this .section. inside attackers can obtain very accurate estimation of GDI by monitoring the messages conveying new.key updating information. referred to as the rekp viessuges. Even if the adversaries cannot become valid group members. they still have the opportunities of stealing GDI as uufside urrackrs as long as they can observe the traffic and distinguish the rekey messages and other data.
In this section. we consider a popular uee-based cenualized key management scheme proposed in 161. then present two 
A. Tree-based centralized nianagenient schemes
Similar to other tree-based schemes [21-[71. the centralized Versakey scheme in [6] employs a key tree to maintain the keying material. As'illustrated in Figure 1 . each node of the key tree is associated with a key. The root of the key tree is associated with the session key (SK). Ii,, which is used to encrypt the multicast content. Each leaf node is associated with a user's private key, I,,. which is only known by this user and the KDC. The intermediate nodes are associated with keyencrypted-keys (KEK). which are auxiliary keys and only for the purpose of protecting the session key and other KEKs. To make concise presentation. we do not distinguish the node and the key associated with this node in the remainder of the paper.
Each user stores his private key. the session key. and a set of KEKs on the path from himself to the root of the key tree. In the example shown in Figure 1: defined as the amount of rekey messages measured in the unit as the same size as SK or KEKs. In this example. the rekey message size is 8 when user 16 leaves the service. It has been shown that the rekey message size increases linearly with the logarithm of the group size [6] .
When a user joins the service. the KDC chooses a leaf position on the key tree to put the joining user. In [6] . each key is associated with a revision number. The KDC updates the keys along the path from the new leaf to the root by generating the new keys from the old keys using a one-way function and increasing the revision numbers of the new keys. . When receiving the rekey message containing A-;""' encrypted by one of his KEKs. he assumes that one user leaves the service.
. When observing the increase of the revision number of Ice. he assumes that one user joins the service.
This strategy is effective when most users do not joinlleave simulraneously and the keys are updated immediately once each user join/departure. Otherwise. more complicated techniques involving examining the rekey message size shall be used. When this attack is successti~l. N(t) can be calculated
and L ( f O , t l )
as:
( 1) Even if the attacker do not know the initial value of the group size. he obtains the changing trend of the group size.
!V(t,) = N ( t o ) + J ( t o ; t 1 ) -L(to,t,).
C. Attack All: Esriiiiation of gi-oirp size fiaiif rekq iflessage size Besides using (I) . the group size N(t) can also he estimated directly from the rekey message size. We will derive a Maximum Likelihood estimator for the attackers and then demonstrate the effectiveness of this estimator through simulations.
We assume that N ( t ) does not change much within a short period of time. In this time period. there are IV departure users who do n i x leave simultaneously. Thus, the attacker makes IV observations of the rekey message size due to single user departure. denoted by M s g = {in1: m 2 :
Similar to most key management schemes [?] -[61. the key tree investigated in this work is fully loaded and maintained as halanced as possible by putting the joining users on the shortest branches. In the worst-case scenario. the attacker knows this property and the degree of the key tree. denoted 
--.CV/ A ' ( t ) = n ) . (2)
TO solve (2). we introduce a set of new variables:
where S, is the number ofusers When the key tree is balanced and fully loaded. it is reasonable to approximate (4) by We assume that the leaving users are uniformly distributed on the key tree. and the number of users in the system is much larger than the number o i leaving users; i.e. N ( t ) >> IV.
Then. the probability mass function (pmf) of Li is 0-7803-8355-9/04/$20.00 (02004 IEEE. We assume that Li:
Thus. the probability in ( 2 ) is calculated as: Besides the tree-based scheme described in Section II-A. VersaKey framework [61 also includes a centralized Hat scheme. When a user joins or leaves the group. the rekey message size equals to the length of the binary representation of the user ID. which can be independent of iV(r). Thus. this key management scheme is resistant to both A I and AI1 type attacks. This scheme. however. is vulnerable to collusion attacks. That is. the KDC cannot update keys without leaking new key information to the leaving user. who has a collusion partner in the group. Although the GDI is protected. this scheme cannot protect the multicast content well when collusion attacks are likely.
In lolus [I I] . a large group is decomposed into a number of subgroups. and the trusted local security agents perform admission control and key updating for the subgroups. This architecture reduces the number of users affected by kcy updating due to membership changes. Since the key updating is localized within each subgroup. the attacker can only obtain the dynamic membership information of the subgroup that he belongs to.
The idea of Clustering was introduced in [I21 to achieve the efficiency by localizing the key updating. The group members are organized into a hierarchical clustering structure. The cluster leaders are selected from group members and perform partial key management. Since the cluster leaders establish keys for the cluster members through pair-wise key exchange [12] . the cluster members cannot obtain GDI of kheir clusters. However. the cluster leaders naturally obtain the dynamic membership infhrmation of their cluster and all clusters below by participating key management. In [12] , the cluster size is chosen from 3 to 15. Therefore. this key management scheme can be applied only when a large potion of group members are trusted to perform key management and obtain GDI.
In [25] . a topology-matching key management (TMKM) scheme was presented to reduce the communication overhead associated with key updating by matching the key tree with the network topology and localizing the uansmission of the rekey messages. In this scheme. group members receive only
the rekey messages that are useful for themselves and their neighbors. Thus. they only obtains the local GDI by using AI or AI1 type attacks.
As a summary, 
AUTI-ATTACK TECHNIQUES
We have discussed two types of attacks that can steal GDI from centralized key management schemes. This discussion. however. docs not cover all aspects of the key mana, Dement schemes that can reveal group dynamic information. For example. the number of KEKs possessed by the inside attacker equals to the depth of the key tree and reveals at least the order of the group size. We can also show that the IDS of the keys reveal the structure of the key tree. Thus. new attack methods may emerge in the future. Therefore. we propose an antiattack framework that is rohust to various types of attacks and compatible with most centralized key management schemes.
We first introduce the concept of Batch RrfeTing that plays an important role in our anti-attack technique. notations of GDI functions are simplified as:
( ( L -l ) & kR,). and N ( k ) = N ( k B t . ) .
Since the AI type attacks are effective only when users are added to or removed from the key tree individually. utilizing hatch rekeying can fight against the AI type attacks. However, batch rekeying alone is not ennugh to fight against the AI1 type attacks. Figure 3 shows some simulation results for the batch rekeying when Bt is set to be 5 minutes. Simulation setup is similar to that in Section Il-C. The solid line in Figure 3(a) . Besides using batch rekeying. we propose to insert phantom users into the system. These phantom users, as well as their join and departure behavior. are created by the KDC in such a way that the combined effects of the phantom users and the real users lead to a new rekeying process. called ohserved rekeing process. which is observed by the attackers. An important goal is for the system to produce an observed rekeying process that reveals the least amount of information about the GDI.
Let iV<,(k) denote the total number of the real and phantom users. and J " ( k ) and L , ( k ) denote the total number of the real and phantom users who jodleave the service respectively.
iV"(t). .Ja(k)> and L , ( k ) are referred to as the ar@cial GDI.
From the key management points of view. the phantom users are treated the same as the real users. They occupy leaf nodes on the key tree. and they are associated with a set of KEKs that are updated when they virtually join or leave the group. Thus, the observed rekeying process only depends on the artificial GDI.
We first consider choosing the artificial GDI as a set of constant functions. that is.
By .doing so. the observed rekeying process does not leak the information about the changing trend of the real GDI.
However. the perfect Hat artificial GDI functions in (9) may not be achievable. Since the real GDI functions are random processes. it is possible that the predetermined Lo and Yo
are not large enough such that the artificial GDI cannot be maintained as straight lines. For example. when iV(A;) > No, iV"(k) cannot be the predetermined value NO because the number O S phantom users must.be non-negative. In fact. the artificial GDI functions must satisfies four requirements: (11)
In this work. we choose the artificial GDI functions as: During this time. the cufrent session key is sent to the joining users such that they can start receiving the multicast content without delay. Utilizing phantom users and batch rekeying is not the only solution to the problem of GDI leakage. There are other techniques that can protect GDI from one or several attacks. For example. embedding rekey messages into the multicat content [7] can prevent outside attackers to launch the AI1 type attacks. Using the same rekeying procedure for user join and departure is also a good way to prevent the A I type attacks.
In addition, the KDC can generate faked rekey messages to prevent the AI1 type attacks. which is different from the proposed anti-attack scheme where the key tree reserves slots for the phantom users and all rekey messages have meanings.
Compared with other techniques. using phantom users and batch rekeying has two major advantages. First. the proposed anti-attack scheme resists to a variety of attacks. Since the real GDI are concealed D~foi-e the rekey messages are generated. the attackers only see the artificial GDI from the observed rekeying process unless they break the encryption or compromise the KDC. Second. the proposed scheme does not rely on specific rekeying algorithms and is compatible with existing key management schemes.
IV. PERFORMASCE MEASURE AND OPTIMIZATION
In this section, we define two performance criteria and evaluate the performance of the proposed anti-attack technique. The criteria are (a) the amount of information leaked to the attackers measured by mutual information. and (b) the communication overhead introduced by the phantom users. We study the tradeoff between these two metrics and provide a framework of choosing proper amount of phantom users.
described by the pwameter Lo and X? in ilO)-(l?).
A. nie leakage of GDI
We use mutual information to measure the leakage of the GDI. which is independent of the attack strategies adopted by the attackers and represents the maximum amount of information that the attackers can possibly ohtain. Let T be the total number of key updating. that is. the service duration is TBt. Then. the real GDI is described by a set of random variables as
and the artificial GDI is
The mutual information. I ( H ; A) . describes the reduction in the uncertainty of the real GDI (R) due to the knowledge of the artificial GDI (A) [23] . Therefore. the leakaze of the GDI can he measured by
I ( R : A ) = H ( A ) -H(AIR):
( 15) where a(.) and H(.l.) denote the entropy and conditional entropy. respectively.
Equation ( . . ~ J , ( T ) ) . Then. the upper bound of I ( R ; A ) is calculated a:
C H ( I V , ( I ; ) ) + C H ( J , , ( I ; ) )
. ' (16)
The equality is achieved when {A',a(I;); J,(k): L = 1,. . . : T } are mutually independent. It is noted that the GDI at time kBt and the GDI at time (I; + l ) B t can he approximately independent when B, is large and the group is high dynamic.
In these cases. (16) provides a tight upper bound of I ( R ; '4).
We introduce p , ,~~( n ) and p~~~ ( 7 7 ) to denote the pmf of :V(k) and :V"[k), respectively. From (10). one can see that 
P,V&(I>) =
Then. (1 -t'j)(l -e ; ) . j = We define overJon probabilip as the probability that the artificial GDI cannot be straight lines. i.e. 1 -muin~;(le&) ( 1 -e:) ( 1 -e $ ) . Besides the mutual information, overnow probability can be a more visualized complementary measure for the leakage of the GDI. When the overflow probability is zero. the calculation in 116)-118) leads to the result that f ( R ; A ) = 0: which indicates the prefect protection of the real GDI.
H ( I v , (~) )
. I P J k ( j ) c /~o P L t ( r l ) f PLk ( j ) C',:: P.II(") 0: O.'llJ. + P J~(~P L & ) > J > LO
B. Curi7rniinication Overliead
Communication overhead. measured by the rekey message size. is one of the major performance criteria of key managemen1 schemes [?] 
Let a ' be the number of KEKs need to he updated at level I when L user leaves the service. Then, M ( L : N: (1) is expressed as:
We introduce the notation B(6, I , a.). which is equivalent to the expected number of nonempty boxes when putting i items in 6 boxes with repetition where each hox'can have at. most n items. The detailed calculation of B (6: i : a.) is provided in the Appendix. We can show that
Using the fact that [ : ] 5 B ( 4 i ? a ) 5 niiii(b, i ) (see Appendix). we can derive the upper bound of the M ( L > N: (1) as: When the overflow probability is small. (24) can be approximated by:
C. S y t o n Optirnizurion
From the system design points of view. parameter LO and NO should be chosen such that the leakage of the GDI is minimized while the extra communication. overhead do not exceed certain requirements: When the overflow probability is small, the optimization problem is formulated as: messages every 15 minutes. The communication overhead C! , is significantly larger than C: , because a large amount of activities of the phantom users must be created. However. die absolute value of the C! , is still small compared with the multicast data throughput. On the other hand. the leakage of the group dynamic information is greatly reduced.
It is imponant to note that this MBone audio session 0-7803-8355-9/04/$20.00 82004 IEEE. Fig. 8 .
audio ssssion
The GDI lralwge versus comrnulucalion warhead for a red MBonc contains only up to 60 users and represents the scenario where the group size is small and group members are not very active. Due to the lack of the experimental data for large multicast groups. we investigated a simulated multicast session with larger group size and more active group members. The simulation setup is the same as that is used for Figure ? 
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper raised the issues of the disclosure of the dynamic group membership information through key management in secure multicast communications. Such a security concern has not been discussed in traditional key management schemes. We demonsuated that the attackers can successfully obtain good estimates of the GDI from a large number of centralized key management schemes. and investipated the techniques of improving the existing key management schemes such that the GDI as well as the multicast content is protected. In panicular.
we developed two effective attack strategies. which exploit the format and the size of the rekey messages. To protect the GDI. 
